Dean A. Pinkert is a partner in Hughes Hubbard’s International Trade practice. He is a former Commissioner of the U.S. International Trade Commission. Pinkert was nominated by President Bush and confirmed by the Senate in 2007, and was designated Vice Chairman by President Obama in 2014.
As a commissioner, Pinkert participated in numerous anti-dumping, countervailing duty, and safeguard investigations, including the special safeguard investigation of passenger tires that resulted in import relief for the domestic tire industry and was upheld by the World Trade Organization. He participated in an unprecedented number of final determinations in Section 337 investigations during his tenure, notably dissenting in an electronic devices case that went to President for policy review. President Obama, relying on many of the factors cited in the dissent, overruled the commission for the first time since 1987.
Pinkert spoke with MetalMiner Editor Jeff Yoders by phone about several issues facing metals producers and manufacturers, including global steel and aluminum overcapacity and how the new Trump administration can approach trade and overcapacity issues. This is part two of our discussion, which focuses on cases that rise to the WTO. See part one here if you missed it.
Jeff Yoders: Is there a risk to elevating any such case to the WTO of essentially spending the money and hiring the lawyers, only to lose the case?
Dean Pinkert: First, there are two types of cases. When there’s a decision by the U.S. Trade Representative‘s office to file a case with the WTO, we’ll call those offensive cases. They are filing a complaint with the WTO saying that another country is violating its trade commitments. By the way, I think the Obama administration was very aggressive at developing and filing cases of that kind.
There is another type, and these are what I was referring to earlier, where the U.S. has an investigation of something, concludes that a trade remedy is appropriate, imposes that trade remedy and then gets sued and it goes to the WTO. In 2002, when the steel safeguard relief was put into place, the U.S. was taken to the WTO by our trading partners and, ultimately, the WTO ruled against the safeguard. It was then withdrawn, although the Bush administration said the reason it was withdrawn was because it achieved its aim of giving the domestic industry some breathing space so that they could regain profitability, not because of the loss.
I was talking more about that more defensive posture in the WTO when I was talking about safeguards.
JY: There’s a lot of talk about a border-adjustment tax right now. Many policy papers are calling the scheme very similar to a value-added tax but only on companies. Is there a chance that such an idea might run afoul of WTO rules?
DP: We don’t now exactly what it would look like or what the final measure, if there is one, would be. We don’t know how the WTO would react to it, either, but it’s possible that the WTO would consider it an export subsidy and, if it did, then that would have some serious consequences because there is a list of various kinds of subsidies, particularly export subsidies, in the WTO agreement. If it was found to be an export subsidy there would be considerable consequences for the U.S.
But, it’s important to note that we don’t even know what the border adjustment tax will look like yet. We would have to see.
JY: Yeah, we’re in speculation territory here…
DP: Yeah. The way I’ve heard it described is that, if you’re paying corporate income tax in the U.S. and you import your inputs for whatever you’re manufacturing, then you would not be able to deduct the costs of your imported inputs from revenue. Whereas, if you used domestic inputs, you would be able to deduct those costs from revenue.
There’s a big difference from existing policy there and there’s been some talk from foreign trading partners about objection to the very idea of border-adjustment, but one of the feelings among manufacturers in the U.S. and others is that a VAT gives foreign exporters an unfair advantage. A VAT is not considered to be an export subsidy by the WTO, so what many of these domestic companies are asking is does the U.S. actually need to impose a VAT to get fair and equal treatment?
Or could the U.S. do something similar but not exactly the same as a VAT via a corporate income tax? If this border-adjustment tax has the same kind of effect as a VAT it could receive the same kind of favorable treatment by the WTO that the VAT countries receive.